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Abstract
According to Cicchetti and Toth (1998), the integration of inadequate biological,
ecological, socioemotional, cognitive, and self-representational forces may foster
psychopathological organization. These forces comprise developmental contextualism.
Contextualism can be visualized as a bidirectional relationship between the individual
and the context (Lemer, 2002). In other words, internal and external forces interact with
one another as they are affecting the organism. Ecology, socioemotionality, cognition,
and biology interact to form the self-representational sense of self or “other” source. This
other source is the subjective experience of the organism and emerges as a force in and of
itself and influences superceding interactions between ecology, cognition,
socioemotionality, and biology. The self-representational sense of self is an internal
experience of the self and is where vulnerability to the outside world develops.
Vulnerability is experienced subjectively as having a weak self-structure and being easily
triggered by unclear or negative contextual variables. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
suggest that security in sense of self, or degree of self-integration may dictate
vulnerability to common psychopathology such as depression and anxiety (Dombeck,
1995). In leau of the potential relationship between these variables, this particular study
assessed how identity vulnerability, depression, and anxiety related to one another
through self-reported measures. There was an indication of comorbidity suggesting that
identity vulnerability is an underlying factor in the development and experience of
depression and anxiety.
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An Introduction to the Developmental Contextualism Surrounding
Identity Vulnerability and the Emergence of Depression and Anxiety
Contextualism refers to the bidirectional relationship between the individual and
the context (Lemer, 2002). Ecology, cognition, socioemotionality, biology, and the selfrepresentational sense of self are in constant interaction (Cicchetti & Toth, 1998). These
forces exist in a dynamic, integrated fashion. To illustrate the idea of developmental
contextualism, consider the conditions required to sustain fire. Other than an initial
spark, there must be oxygen, combustible material, dryness, and containment of heat. If
any of those variables are missing or inadequate, the fire struggles to grow and often
diminishes. Much like fire is the derivative of all its ingredients, contextualism is the
byproduct of all aspects of human experience and can be characterized by the integration
of ecology, cognition, socioemotionality, biology, and the self-representational sense of
self. Ecology refers to the physical environment in constant interaction with the self,
cognition refers to the thought process, socioemotionality refers to the affective
experience of the outside world, biology refers to temperament and predisposition, and
the self-representational sense of self refers to the internal experience of the self or
culmination of these forces at work. Collectively, these forces shape the inner experience
of the organism by developing the self-representational sense of self. Perspectives of the
outside world “update” the inner self over the course of time changing the way in which
subsequent ecological, cognitive, socioemotional, and biological forces are integrated.
Ecology
The ecology component of developmental contextualism can be characterized as a
“transaction of multilevel potentiating compensatory processes” involving four levels
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(Cicchetti & Toth, 1998, p. 226). In other words, there are four coexisting dimensions of
ecology that affect one another. The ontogenic component refers to the self-source; the
microsystem refers to family; the exosystem refers to community; and the macrosystem
refers to culture. Abrams, Theberge, and Karan (2005) utilized an ecological approach in
treating depression in school children. The proposed models incorporated the student’s
school “life” with family and community with the intention of providing a well-rounded
intervention. This research indicated that the children’s self-source is in constant
interaction with their microsystem (i.e., parents), their exosystem (i.e., school system),
and their macrosystem (i.e., religious practice). The purpose of this research was to
illustrate how important it is to maintain the balance between the individual and the
system of people, places, and things that are in both direct and indirect interaction with
that individual (Abrams et al., 2005).
A pivotal study conducted by Oatley and Bolton (1985) presented a “theory of
reaction to life events”, and suggested that when events disrupt the way in which
individuals define themselves, and these individuals lack sources of self-definition,
depression is likely to emerge. In other words, when an individual’s self-perceived role
or self-image at a particular moment is challenged by the ecological context, this
vulnerable individual experiences the discrepancy as depression. Therefore, an
individual lacking sources of self-definition is also likely poorly self-integrated (Oatley &
Bolton, 1985; Dombeck, 1995). As such, individuals with lower “thresholds” are likely to
be more affected by ecological challenges. This lower threshold closely parallels the idea
of identity vulnerability in that these individuals are unable to “use themselves as a
resource” in the face of a changed ecological context. Therefore, depression can be
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understood as a cognitive process whereby one’s self-image becomes faint in the
presence of discrepancy.
Cognition and the Socioemotional Process
According to Lemer (2002), “cognition refers to thought, consciousness, and
knowing, and the study of cognition involves an appraisal of the processes involved in
the acquisition and utilization of knowing” (p. 334). There are six key dimensions of
knowing. A “process” refers to a change in the function of knowing and includes
concepts such as thinking and information processing. “Abilities” refer to skills that
individuals possess such as intelligence, temperamental resilience, and meta-cognition.
“Motivation” refers to the conditions whereby processes or abilities are enacted.
Examples of this would be exploration and curiosity. “Achievements” refer to the
outcomes of these enactments. For example, exploring intelligence may lead to increased
knowledge. “Contribution” refers to how abilities and achievements have affected the
ecology of the organism. For example, exploration of intelligence and enhanced
knowledge may lead an individual to pursue further education. Lastly, “context” refers
to the role of the ecological framework on overall human development. An example of
this might be the adaptive gains associated with higher education (Lemer, 2002).
According to this model of thought, abilities and achievements are important
dimensions of knowing that can be adaptive or maladaptive. For example, common
sense would tell us that an individual who possesses low temperamental resilience and
consistently engages in maladaptive thinking is at risk for becoming poorly selfintegrated. Further distorted maladaptive thought processes might contribute to the
individual’s already fragmented self-image, potentiating psychopathology such as
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depression. Developmental^ speaking, cognition is a cycle of steps whereby the self
comes to know the self in relation to the outside world. It stands to reason that problems
arise when appropriate self-integration does not occur (Dombeck, 1995).
According to Cicchetti and Toth (1998), socioemotionality refers to processes and
abilities related to “affect regulation, attachment organization, self-esteem, interpersonal
relations, guilt, and other emotive-based processes” (p. 225). Socioemotionality and
cognition are highly related to one another in that socioemotionality has underlying
cognitive components. Essentially, the “ability” to experience emotive-based processes
is cognitive in nature while the process itself is socioemotional. The major distinction
between them is that socioemotionality refers to ones ability to “feel” in response to
contextual variables while cognition refers to ones ability to think or “know.”
Scheier and Carver (1977) proposed a “salience hypothesis” whereby selfawareness (a cognitive ability and enactment) directly impacts emotional intensity.
Basically, if there is no internal discrepancy, they believe attention will shift to any
internal experience. It should be stressed that self-awareness does not necessarily
enhance internal states; it enhances awareness of them making them more salient.
According to Scheier and Carver (1977), self-focused individuals are more likely to
notice their affective experiences rather than experience them more strongly.
Consequently, self-awareness serves to enhance the saliency of negative affective states
such as anxiety. It stands to reason that individuals who experience excessive anxiety are
consistently self-focused and vulnerable to negative environmental stimuli. Therefore,
high anxiety may be indicative of a weak self-structure or poor self-integration
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(Dombeck, 1995). If depression and anxiety are both related to poor self-integration,
how do we distinguish between the two?
Clark, Steer, and Beck (1994) sought to distinguish between the process of
depression and anxiety by utilizing “tripartite and cognitive models.” They determined
that physiological arousal and positive affect are experienced exclusively in anxious
individuals while depressives experienced amotivational symptoms and negative affect.
What this study tells us is that cognitive factors such as negative attributional style,
negative self-referent thinking, and dysfunctional beliefs are not specific to depression
but instead characterize the cognitive piece of negative affect and that anxiety can be
distinguished from depression by the presence of physiological hyperarousal symptoms
while depression can be differentiated from anxiety by symptoms indicative of low
positive affect (Clark, Steer, & Beck, 1994).
So basically, there is a cognitive aspect to the socioemotional process of negative
affect whereby an individual comes to know a distorted, inadequate self devoid of
positive affect. This closely resembles the emergence of a depressive state. Anxiety, on
the other hand, tends to be more episodic and is characterized by physiological arousal
with the ability to experience positive affect except during the subjective experience of
negative affect. Depression appears to represent a more pervasive state of mind that the
self comes to know that is more cognitive in nature. Anxiety seems more socioemotional
in nature with cognitive implications over time as negative affect prevails. Persistent
anxiety may lead to the development of depression over time and once a depressive state
has emerged, there may be an enhanced vulnerability to subsequent anxiety.
Biology
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According to Cicchetti and Toth (1998), biology, as it pertains to psychology,
refers to predispositions such as “genetics, physiological processes, brain structural
anomalies, neuroendicrine disregulation, neurotransmitter anomalies, and hemispheric
activation and asymmetries” (p. 225). One might find them self compelled to consider
the notion that biology sets most standards. Perhaps our personality structure,
temperament, and monoaminergic potentials are predetermined and control how the
outside environment affects us. Joiner, Brown, and Wingate (2005) were interested in
understanding the role of neurobiological and psychological components involved in
suicide, an ideation and behavior highly associated with depression. They determined that
poorly regulated impulse control and tendency to experience strong psychological pain
were in fact predispositional and led to suicidal ideation and behavior. This suggests that
depression may also be predispositional.
While twin studies such as Roy (1992) and Roy and Segal (2001) determined that
monozygotic twin pairs, over dizygotic, were far more likely to pursue suicide,
Glowinski, Buchulz, Nelson, Fu, Madden, Reich, and Heath (2001) were more interested
in the underlying environmental factors that foster this predisposition. Based on their
data, it was determined that 48% of suicidal development was neurobiological, 44% was
environmental, and 8% was shared between neurobiology and environment (at least in
their subject pool). They also determined that depression over anxiety was highly related
to suicide.

These studies indicate an effect for neurobiology in the development of

suicide. And furthermore, that depression contributed highly to the state of mind
required to pursue suicide.
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Wetherell, Gatz, and Pederson (2001) conducted a longitudinal study assessing
anxiety and depressive symptoms over three-year intervals. Anxiety and depression
correlated significantly and appeared to be temperamental. Furthermore, anxiety led to
depressive onset across twin pairs over time. Those who are predisposed to anxiety and
depression are therefore vulnerable to negative environmental variables and are more
likely to develop anxiety and depression than those who are not predisposed. Essentially,
they are poorly self-integrated in part because of deficient neurobiological processes.
To illustrate the potential role of biology, consider the following hypothetical
analogy illustrated in Figure 1. The graph represents three individuals’ relative
positioning in the best environment will experience slightly more than individual C raised
the best in terms of temperamental affectivity. The potential range between the
expression outcome of best and worst environments can be called the “potentiality
range,” for a lack of better terms, and can be seen on the graph as v-shaped lines. The top
leg represents the hypothetical limit of being raised in the worst environment possible
and the lower leg represents the best.

Figure 1
Hypothetical simplified temperament for negative affect for 3
individuals (A, B, and C)
A in the best environment (+) is exhibits more negative
affect (>NA) than B and C in worst environments (-)
A (+E) > S than B, C (-E)
B (+E) > S than C (+E)
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The “Other” Source
Within the framework of contextualism, there exists an “other” source of
influence, a self-representational sense of self (Cicchetti & Toth, 1998; Lemer, 2002).
The integration of the previously mentioned contextual factors exist in a dynamic,
integrated fashion, moment-by-moment. Each new moment is affected by the previous,
which was affected by the previous, and so on. As “moments” accumulate, the selfrepresentational sense of self emerges and strengthens. This source affects how
subsequent biological and environmental variables influence development. Figure 2
modified from Cicchetti & Toth (1998) illustrates the relationship of the abovementioned variables within the framework of a multilevel contextualism and time.
Double arrows represent the dynamic relationship between variables and the development
of contextualism. Over time, the self-representational sense of self can develop
psychopathologically in response to inadequate contextual variables.
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Consider the following hypothetical analogy. At Time 1, ecology,
socioemotionality, cognition, and biology culminate to form “an internal experience.”
This experience now serves as an additional force going into the next “contextual
moment.” So at Time 2, biology, ecology, socioemotionality, and cognition interact with
this previous internal experience, or self-representational sense of self, to create a new
internal experience. As this cycle repeats, the self-representational sense is continually
“updated” and emerges as an extremely prominent force, perhaps more so than the others.
As the figure above illustrates, psychopathology develops from within this source and
strengthens as experiences continually end with negative affective consequences. Over
time, the consequences reaffirm a negative self-image or diminished sense of self. As the
“self-structure” weakens, susceptibility to the effects of unclear or negative contextual
variables increases and psychopathology develops (Cicchetti & Toth, 1998; Lemer, 2002;
Dombeck, 1995). Some common manifestations are anxiety and depression. This
subjective experience can become vicious, debilitating, habitual and difficult to
overcome, especially with the passing of time.
Perceived Instability and the Self-Representational Self
According to Lemer (2002), perceived instability becomes an essential issue over
time as well. This refers to one’s “position” relative to everyone else (see Figure 3).
Hypothetically speaking, individual (C) at time 1 perceives his or herself to lie in the 60th
percentile for academic performance. One year later, this individual has not experienced
substantial academic growth, but his or her peers have. Now he or she is self-perceived
at the 50th percentile while previously lower individual (B) has improved. Individual (C)
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now experiences increased negativity toward the self, which then continues to negatively
impact future performance while individual (B) feels more positive.
However, suppose individual (A) is not at all affected by lying in the lowest
relative position and (D) remains the highest, but is not content with compromising
perfection while (C) has become increasingly unstable. It may be safe to say that
individual (A) is less vulnerable than (C), and (D) may be the most vulnerable, especially
to disruption of “perfect” self-perceived performance (relative to everyone else). In other
words, if individual (D) were to drop (still above (B) and (C)); self-perceived instability
could result in higher affective negativity than that of (C)’s self-perceived drop.
Individual (C) may in fact begin to feel better about his or her relative position because of
“perfect” (D)’s decreased performance.

Figure 3
Stability-Instability

Identity Vulnerability
The key variable within these comparisons is an inner source of vulnerability:
how some are more affected than others by varying degrees of self-perceived instability.
This inner vulnerability can only be related to ego identity, self-image, and physiological
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arousal (Dombeck, 1995). Therefore, the concept of identity vulnerability should refer to
the combined effect of temperamental resilience, and duration and salience of negative
emotionality. That being said, one must consider degree of vulnerability of identity as a
major predictor of depression and anxiety. Identity vulnerability can be characterized by
fear of emotion, lack of confidence to cope, and identity fragmentation (Dombeck, 1995).
Threat to identity is a rather unexplored domain in that few have been able to capture the
essence of what is to have a weak self-structure or to be poorly self-integrated. What is
for certain is that there seems to be two types of personalities: one that self-reports
identity vulnerability, depression, and anxiety and one that does not.
A substantial portion of current research considers introversion over extroversion
a predictor of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation and behavior or any
psychopathological dichotomy (Roy, 1998; Watson & Clark, 1997; Wiggins & Pincus,
1989). Dombeck (1995) illustrated a negative correlation between extroversion and
identity vulnerability such that those who were extroverts tended to self-report less
identity vulnerability. It also seems likely then that extroverts are not very focused on
their own affective states and are less likely to self-report depression and anxiety than
introverts. Perhaps extroverts are vulnerable to depression and anxiety, but are unaware
unless introversion is somehow triggered.
Those who self attribute negative outcomes to themselves and positive to others
are thought to be acting in an introverted manner, a state of objective self-awareness
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972).

Conversely, subjective self-awareness does not require any

self-focus and can be better characterized as outward or extroverted thinking (Duval &
Wicklund, 1972). Those who attribute positive outcomes toward themselves and
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negative toward others are generally thought to be acting in an extroverted manner. In
fact, Magnus, Diener, Fujita, and Pavot (1993) found that extroverted individuals are
more likely to experience more positive objective life events while introverted
individuals are more likely experience negative life events.
Sociotropy and autonomy are also significant distinctions in the development of
depression and anxiety. Sociotropy refers to the tendency to work and associate with
others whereas autonomy refers to the tendency to maintain independence. Some suggest
that extremely sociotropic or autonomous individuals are at elevated risk for depression
(Blatt & Schichman, 1983; Blatt & Zuroff, 1992; Beck, Epstein & Ranieri, 1983; and
Robins, 1990). Basically, the sociotropic type fears abandonment or interpersonal loss
while the autonomous individual experiences fear of failure and loss of control.
A point of interest is the parallel between introversion and autonomy and
extroversion and sociotropy. The autonomous individual has internal fears whereas the
sociotropic individual has external fears. The question is why are both types susceptible
to depression if both do not self-report? Perhaps sociotropic individuals lack self-focus
and are unaware of their true inner state. Or perhaps sociotropic individuals, like
extroverts, require a “breaking point” whereby introversion consequently ensues.
Regardless, one has to wonder whether introverted and autonomous coping styles are
dispositional or an unconscious choice?
Watson and Clark (1984) describe a relationship between negative affectivity and
disposition or neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968). Trait disposition toward
psychopathology can promote negative affective qualities to surface with less negative
stimulation than if there were no disposition. As previously implied, neurobiology can
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render an individual more susceptible or vulnerable to the development of an inadequate
self-structure. Accordingly, Dombeck (1995) holds that low self-esteem, self
preoccupation, and insecurity are highly related cognitive states (or maladaptive abilities)
that can be dispositional. Costa and McCrae (1987) and Watson and Clark (1984)
describe these negative states as comprising only part of normal personality; that those
with higher levels are more likely to develop depression, anxiety, or mixed anxietydepression. Disposition can and will set the tone for a vulnerable identity structure
provided the environment exacerbates things. Other factors such as self-concept play an
important role in the exploitation of the vulnerable self.
Self-concept centers on conscious self-beliefs that define the limitations of the
self and self-structure (Dombeck, 1995). Discomfort caused by inconsistent cognitions
whereby the real and ideal perceived-self vary is referred to as cognitive dissonance.
Festinger (1957) holds that the awareness of ideological discrepancies or mutually
exclusive beliefs within the self results in cognitive dissonance, which leads to arousal
and negative affect. Accordingly, disregulated individuals with poor self-concepts are
prone to experiencing a higher discrepancy. The ongoing process substantially affects
self-esteem and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Rosenberg, 1979). While individuals seek
to reduce discrepancy between the “perceived” real and “ideal” self involving positive
references, people also seek to increase discrepancy between the perceived real and idealself involving negative references. The autonomous types often seek to increase
negatively referenced self-discrepancies while sociotropic types often seek to reduce
positively referenced self-discrepancy.

Identity Vulnerability 14
The capacity to experience positive emotion may also play a significant role in
identity vulnerability and the development of depression and anxiety. Hedonic affect
refers to subjective experience of pleasurable emotionality (Dombeck, 1995). Anhedonia
refers to just the opposite: an inability to experience pleasurable emotionality. According
to Joiner, Brown, & Wingate (2005) this may be related to dopaminergic system
deficiencies, specifically a decrease in dopamine reuptake. This feature has appeared in
both depressed and schizophrenic brain systems.
In parallel, Berenbaum and Connelly (1993) have found that stressful life events
and chronic stress do trigger psychiatric disturbance, such as depression, in some but not
all. This suggests that those who are biologically predisposed to psychopathology are
more likely to experience stress-induced anhedonia. Furthermore, Quitkin et al. (1990)
sets forth the notion that mood elevation through induced positive affect is common in
atypical depression only. Therefore, stress should in fact contribute to typical depression
by increasing negative affect and decreasing hedonia. Similarly, Berenbaum and
Connolly (1993) illustrate that stress will reduce hedonic capacity and positive affect, but
not negative affect. The implication of stress as a negative environmental variable
affecting some more than others is highly suggestive of an underlying vulnerability.
Individuals demonstrating higher susceptibility than others to affective
disregulation may be operating from a discernible, vulnerable identity structure. A threat
to identity is more or less effective when someone’s sense of “who they are” and “who
they’ve been” becomes increasingly less clear. Therefore, anyone in a self-perceived
weakened state should be more susceptible to identity threats. Figure 4 illustrates that as
identity strength decreases, so does the ability cope with insufficient or negative contexts.
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This is clearly explained in Dombeck’s (1995) dissertation pertaining to identity
vulnerability.
Figure 4
Vulnerability to the Context

Low Identity
Strength

Moderate
Identity Strength

High Identity
Strength

Dombeck (1995) constructed the Threats to Identity Questionnaire (TIQ) to assess
self-integration, which is referred to as the degree of integration current among cognitive
components underlying the subjective experience of the self. Stemming from the
longstanding relationship between personality and psychopathology (e.g., James, 1890;
Maher & Maher, 1994), Dombeck sought to develop a means for measuring vulnerability
to negative affective mind-states or psychopathology. Within this framework, poor self
integration, or disregulation, will essentially lead to vulnerable identity structure, or
susceptibility to the development of depression and anxiety.
Threat to Identity Questionnaire Validity and Reliability
Others have attempted to assess ego-identity and ego-development but have
lacked context regarding self-integration. The Threat to Identity Questionnaire, or TIQ
(Dombeck, 1995) was constructed to assess just this. Items were designed based on
qualities determined to be characteristic of a diminished sense of self via factor analysis.
Poorly constructed and irrelevant items were eliminated. The TIQ measures self-

Identity Vulnerability 16
integration by assessing aspects of the self that are influenced by chronic poor selfintegration (Dombeck, 1995). Questionnaire items were originally constructed to assess
self-stability, fear of losing control, social withdrawal, and emotional overload. The
initial list of potential items was sent out to 150 clinicians; nearly 23% responded and
provided additional information surrounding the concept of self-integration. Additional
measures were also suggested that could help account for the convergent and divergent
validity. Once a 93-item prototype and additional measures that assess personality and
demographics were compiled, participating students were administered the package.
Along with the prototype, the package included the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory-II (MCMI2; Millon, 1987), the Splitting Scale (SS; Gerson, 1984), the Ego
Identity Scale (EIS; Tan, Dendis, Fine, & Porac, 1977), the Intense Ambivalence Scale
(IAS; Raulin, 1984), the Manifest Anxiety Scale (MAS; Taylor, 1953), and the MarlowCrowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). A majority of
the variance could be explained by 18 items, which were divided into three categories
surrounding self-integration: fear of emotion, lack of confidence to cope, and identity
fragmentation (Dombeck, 1998). The new 18-item prototype proved to reliably assess
self-integration.
Next, the 18-item TIQ’s three factors were compared to additional measures of
personality, negative affect, and self-concept (Dombeck, 1998). Such scales included the
Life Optimism Test (Scheier & Carver, 1985) and the Eysenck Personality Inventory
Neuroticism Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968). Thirty- eight additional TIQ items were
included in this administration. Again, nonsignificant items were removed until a 30item prototype explained nearly 50 percent of the variance. The 30-item TIQ correlated
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highly with other measures of depression, anxiety, neuroticism, schizotypal
characteristics, avoidance, ambivalent cognition, splitting, and passive aggression
(Dombeck, 1998).
Further confirmatory procedures utilized a 50 item-TIQ, the NEO Personality
Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992), the Bern Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bern, 1974), the
Fear of Negative Evaluation and Social Avoidance and Distress scales (FNE, SADS;
Watson & Friend, 1969), the Adult Nowicki Strickland Internal External Control Scale
(ANSIECS; Nowicki & Duke, 1983), the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS;
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Clark, 1991), the Speilberger State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983; Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970),
and the Personality Style Inventory 2 (PSI2; Robins, 1991). Again, nearly 30-TIQ items
explained 50% of the variance. Correlations were consistent, showing that once again
that the TIQ was a reliable and valid measure of self-integration.
Additional validity analyses were needed to distinguish self-integration from
affective negativity. Intercorrelations between the TIQ and Manifest Anxiety Scale
suggested that perhaps the TIQ measured negative affect over self-integration. To
answer this question, Dombeck (1998) looked for similarities in cognitive and personality
functioning among individuals with a variety of self-reported negative affect, but who
shared similar reports in self-integration. In terms of the three factors or constructs (fear
of emotion, lack of confidence to cope, and identity fragmentation), partial correlations of
the variances were computed and compared with those of other measures of personality
to assess for convergent and divergent validity. Results indicated that the revised TIQ-30
was in fact a reliable and valid measure of self-integration.
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To determine whether the TIQ assesses self-integration over negative affectivity,
108 individuals completed the revised TIQ-30 and other personality measures.
Participants also engaged in a series of information processing tasks thought to be
experientially free from subjective bias. The purpose of this addition was to account for
some of the variance, which was characterized by those individuals who did not selfreport accurately or were hesitant due to having the time to process the question.
Depression and Anxiety
Two subscales that assess for depression and anxiety include the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI: Beck & Steer, 1987) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck &
Steer, 1990). They are reliable, valid, positively correlated with one another, and
represent some of the most current and widely accepted assessment methods for neurosis.
These scales assess appropriately according to DSM IV-TR (2003) diagnostic criteria for
depressive and anxiety disorders, and serve as a reliable measure at predicting suicide in
both clinical and non-clinical settings (BDI: Beck & Steer, 1987; BAI: Beck & Steer,
1990). Depression and anxiety are very common and, in most cases, part of the
symptomology of other disorders such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder (DSM IV-TR,
2003).
Beck and Steer (1987) break depression into two constructs: somatic-affective and
cognitive depression. The somatic-affective dimension refers more to the physical
experience of depression whereas the cognitive dimension refers more to thought
processes behind it. Beck and Steer (1990) break anxiety into four constructs:
neurophysiological, autonomic, panic, and subjective anxiety. Neurophysiological and
autonomic anxieties refer more to the somatic dimensions of anxiety where as panic and

Identity Vulnerability 19
subjective anxieties refer more to the self-experience of anxiety. Despite the experiential
differences, these constructs are highly related to one another and illustrate how
depression and anxiety manifests itself differently in different people.
Depression and anxiety are also highly comorbid. In fact, Maurizio, Rankin,
Wright, Alpert, Nierenberg, Pava, and Rosenbaum (2000) found that in 255 depressed
outpatients (aged 18-65 yrs), anxiety disorder diagnoses were present in 50.6% of
patients. Anxiety disorder diagnoses included simple and social phobias, panic disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, agoraphobia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. One of
two scenarios seems likely. Either those who suffer from depression tend suffer from
anxiety or prolonged subjective experience of anxiety tends to lead to the onset of
depression. Either way the two are closely related.
Depression can be conceptualized as experiencing a diminished or loss of self
security and include symptoms such as sadness, loneliness, disinterest, self-criticism, dull
mood, weight gain or loss, fatigue, insomnia or hypersomnia, feelings of worthlessness,
inability to concentrate or make decisions, hopelessness, and often times, anxiety (Beck
& Steer, 1987; DSM IV, 2000; Lewis & Sian, 1995). Life becomes less salient, and
those qualities that once comprised one’s sense of identity no longer provide comfort
(i.e., a favorite movie). Most would define depression by its symptomology (i.e., no
sense of self-worth). The question is what is depression underneath the sadness,
hopelessness, and anxiety? Is the “numbness” associated with depression actually “the
self experiencing the loss of self’? In other words, does depression truly characterize
empty self-experience?
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Lewis and Sian (1995) qualitatively describe depression as a loss of self whereby
the self is determined through social relationships. They were interested in how
individuals come to subjectively identify themselves as depressed. Depression is
conceptualized as being “lost in unemployment”, that individuals see themselves as
experiencing bio-malfunction or inadequate social dimensions (Lewis & Sian, 1995).
Essentially, individuals see themselves as affected by outside forces, beyond their
control. Individuals reported that they were unaware of where the depression came from,
how it was maintained, and how to put an end to it (Lewis & Sian, 1995). Individuals
seemed more comforted by the biological explanation because it implies that it is beyond
their control.
This study reiterates that the subjective experience of depression is different
across individuals and that the common explanation offered by individuals afflicted with
depression is that they experience a loss in sense of self; that they are essentially unable
to use themselves as a resource. This strongly supports the idea of an inner sense of
vulnerability; that the subjective experience of depression renders individuals to varying
degrees unable to return back to themselves. If identity vulnerability implies that an
individual’s sense of self is easily disrupted, then according to this model of depression,
individuals suffering from depression are vulnerable to inadequate environmental
supports. This underlying vulnerability is likely to encourage the attribution of negative
events to the self.
Brewin (1985) proposes five potential models of depression, all of which involve
causal attribution and can be explained in terms of identity vulnerability. Selfattributional style and identity vulnerability are fundamentally similar in that they are

Identity Vulnerability 21
essentially a reflection of one another. If an individual’s coping style is to self-attribute
negative events, this individual is overly vulnerable to negative events. Therefore
identity vulnerability may be considered the cause of depressive maintenance as much as
attributional style. Brewin (1985) created and assessed five models of attributiondepression that are as follows: there is a “symptom model” whereby a bad event leads to
depressive onset resulting in depressive attributions; there is an “onset model” which
holds that a bad event leads to depressive attribution resulting in depressive onset; there is
a “vulnerability model” which suggests that a bad event coupled with depressive
attributional style leads to depressive attribution resulting in depressive onset; there is a
“recovery model” whereby a bad event leads to depressive onset which leads to
depressive attributional style and results in depression maintenance; and lastly there is a
“coping model” which simply suggests that depressive attributional style leads to
depression maintenance or onset.
There are a variety of implications and conclusions, but the essential purpose of
Brewin’s models is to explain depression through the learned helplessness theory, which
may also be fundamentally related to identity vulnerability. Possessing a vulnerable
identity is essentially a learned condition as much as it is biological. Accordingly, those
individuals with a diminished sense of self, or “poor self-integration” are likely more
susceptible to a cyclic self-attributional psychopathological lifestyle and are prone to
depressive onset. This research beautifully illustrates the outcome of persistent negative
self-attribution and demonstrates how depressed individuals come to understand
themselves as helpless or vulnerable to the outside world. This study also implies that
depression is a cognitive process that, when reinforced, strengthens with the passing of
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time. More socioemotional in nature, anxiety seems to wax and wane depending on the
changing context.
Anxiety can be characterized as a feeling of concern or intense worrying that is
accompanied by “restlessness, being easily fatigued, difficulty concentrating, irritability,
muscle tension, and disturbed sleeping patterns” (DSMIV, 2000, p. 472). Anxiety
occurs in varying intensities and different durations. For some, anxiety may only be
mild, for others, anxiety may be debilitating and encourage depressive onset. Often
times, anxiety is episodic and triggered by environmental stimuli. This type of anxiety
stems from conflict whereby the self is challenged by something in the environment
creating dissonance (Festinger, 1957). For example, an individual might fear becoming
overweight when viewing models on television. Rosenbaum (1953) held that anxiety
was an internal response to previously neutral cues, which have now become associated
with debilitating stimulation. So for some, anxiety may be a common aspect of subjective
experience whereby things become associated with the anxious state, consequently
creating triggers in the immediate environment.
Zinbarg, Brown, Barlow & Rapee (2001) assessed “anxiety sensitivity”, or
excessive worry of increased negative affect in the development of panic. They define
panic as a subjectively experienced, intensified and concentrated phase of anxiety with
psychosomatic symptoms (Zinbarg et. al (2001). One of the more important findings in
this research was that mental incapacitation concerns, one aspect of anxiety sensitivity,
strongly correlated with depression. The fear of mental incapacitation is an important
aspect of the anxiety sensitivity because it implies that there is a fear of being mentally
“taken over” by the anxiety associated with a particular stimulus. This very closely
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parallels the concept of identity vulnerability in that there is a fear of being engulfed by
some outside influence; that the self is not cohesive enough to sustain injury from the
outside.
Mineka and Zinbarg (2006) present a learning theory perspective on the
development and characteristics of anxiety. This research explains how temperamental
vulnerabilities and early learning styles impact reactions to stressful events through the
utilization of a more contextual approach to understanding anxiety both pre-and-post
onset. The development of anxiety is thought to stem from the combined effect of
vulnerability and stress with pre-and-post conditioning processes. In this particular
model vulnerability refers to genetics or temperament and learning history. In other
words, poor self-integration and stress will lead to anxiety. So essentially, Mineka and
Zinbarg (2006) present a contextual approach to understanding how identity vulnerability
develops, and once coupled with stress, results in the onset of anxiety.
Theory and Hypotheses
The purpose of this study was to assess the relationship between criterion
variable- depression and predictor variables- fear of emotion (FE), lack of confidence to
cope (LCC) and identity fragmentation (IF) vulnerability as well as criterion variableanxiety and predictor variables- FE, LCC, and IF. Combined effects among individual
predictors and their subscales will determine statistical contribution to depression and
anxiety. Simple correlations will also be computed between depression, anxiety and
identity vulnerability subscales. This study hypothesized the following: 1) Identity
vulnerability will predict self-reported depression; 2) Identity vulnerability will predict
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self-reported anxiety; 3) Depression and Anxiety will correlate; and 4) Identity
Vulnerability will correlate with Depression over Anxiety.
Method
Participants

All participants were Montclair State University undergraduate students. There
were 87 participants who were randomly assigned to sequential patterns. All scales were
administered in an isolated laboratory setting and completed via self-report.
Design /Procedure

There were three scales (the BDI, BAI, and TIQ) administered in three rotational
sequences. There were 29 participants per sequence, randomly assigned for a grand total
of 87 participants. The three sequences were rotational orders of administration (i.e. BDI
- TIQ, BAI - BDI, and TIQ - BAI). Participants were asked to respond carefully, but
expeditiously. There were no time constraints and all participants were debriefed
concluding self-report.
Results
Correlation coefficients were calculated among two depression subscales
(somatic-affective and cognitive depression), four anxiety subscales (neurological,
subjective, panic, and autonomic anxiety) and three threat to identity subscales (fear of
emotion, lack of confidence to cope, and identity fragmentation). Use of the Bonferroni
method controlled for Type 1 error across the correlations. As such, a p <.01 was
required for significance. All correlations were statistically significant (see Table 1)
except for Panic-Fear of Emotion and Panic- Lack of Confidence to Cope.
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Table 1
Correlation Matrix
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.4 3 8

.4 9 6

.3 1 3

.4 6 5
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A multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine how well threat to
identity predicted depression. The predictors were three subscales with the TIQ (fear of
emotion, lack of confidence to cope, and identity fragmentation) and the criterion
variable was the BDI. The linear combination of the TIQ measures is significantly
related to the BDI, F(3, 83) = 57.98, p < .01. The sample multiple correlation coefficient
was .82 indicating that approximately 68% of the variance of the BDI in the sample can
be related to the linear combination of the TIQ subscales.
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Figure 5

Threat to Identity
A second multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine how well
threat to identity predicted anxiety. Again the predictors were fear of emotion, lack of
confidence to cope, and identity fragmentation, but with the criterion variable BAI. The
linear combination of the TIQ measures is significantly related to the BAI, F(3, 83) =
11.11,p < .01. The sample multiple correlation coefficient was .54 indicating that
approximately 29% of the variance of the BAI in the sample can be explained by the
linear combination of the TIQ subscales. Individual contribution of identity
fragmentation was higher than that of fear of emotion and lack of confidence to cope.
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What can be seen in the graph below is a less defined regression line than that of the BDI
and the TIQ.
Figure 6

Threat to Identity
Discussion
The data obtained in this study indicate that identity vulnerability characterized by
fear of emotion, lack of confidence to cope, and identity fragmentation does in fact
contribute to the emergence of depression and anxiety. Of the three dimensions of
identity vulnerability, identity fragmentation seemed to contribute most. Of the two
dimensions of depression, most of the participants indicated that they experienced
somatic-affective symptoms over cognitive. Of the four dimensions of anxiety, most of
the participants indicated that they experienced subjective anxiety followed by
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neurological, autonomic, and panic. Comparison of data also indicates that the
relationship between identity vulnerability (and its three dimensions) and depression is
clearer than that of identity vulnerability and anxiety. What do these findings suggest
about the nature of the self? Findings indicate that identity fragmentation is one of the
major underlying factors in the development of depression and anxiety more so than fear
of emotion and lack of confidence to cope. And second, that identity vulnerability has
more in common with depression than anxiety.
This study’s focus was to understand the nature of contextualism and the role of
the self-structure in the development of depression and anxiety. According the Cicchetti
and Toth (1998) ecology, cognition, socioemotionality, biology, and the selfrepresentational sense of self comprise our developmental existence. There is an
embeddedness of these forces such that they affect us in a dynamic integrated fashion.
For example, one particular individual’s self-representational sense of self develops as he
or she continues to learn through ecological and socioemotional influence, as a function
of his or her biology. The proposition that the self exists essentially as an additional
domain of influence suggests that there is an internal experiential memory. It seems
likely that this is where one “learns” to experience depression and anxiety through a
vulnerable, inadequate, or poorly developed sense of self. So how then are depression
and anxiety “learned” and what lies underneath? What precedes their emergence?
If an individual was predisposed to neurochemical disregulation and
environmental supports were insufficient, socioemotional processes would become
“unproductive” and nonconductive to age appropriate development. Human development
should be visualized as a set of stages (as many have already proposed and proven)
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whereby interpersonal needs must be fulfilled in order for an individual to move to the
next stage. Once one of these stages is disrupted, the individual is not adequately
prepared for subsequent stages. What this does over time is produce an individual with a
poorly integrated sense of self. An individual’s sense of self can be thought of as one’s
ability to appropriately utilize the self as a resource. There needs to be strength of
character or an “inner self-structure”. Without this, an individual is vulnerable to
negative environmental influences or the effects of a lack of positive stimuli.
Understanding developmental contextualism is essential when trying to
conceptualize sense of self. Without understanding the role that biology, ecology,
socioemotionality, and cognition play in the development of the self as a resource, one
cannot understand the implications of depression and anxiety. Consider the following
hypothetical narrative. A baby is brought into a single parent world. The mother must
work two jobs to support her and the baby. As such, the baby sees very little of the
mother and instead forms a bond with his grandmother. As the mother becomes aware of
this, she pulls the baby away from the grandmother out of resentment and begins
spending more time with him. Only, this doesn’t last because she must resume her
second job to ensure that financial obligations are met. So the grandmother is permitted
once again to become the central figure in the baby’s life until the resentment is
experienced again and the baby is pulled away from the grandmother again. This cycle
repeats itself several times and eventually the baby enters childhood with severe
attachment issues and a pervasive sense of powerlessness. Not having had the
opportunity to form a secure attachment has rendered the child unable to handle the
outside world.
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Now let’s suppose that this child suffers from poor neurochemical regulation;
inherited from his mother who suffered mental illness her entire life. This child has
“learned” through inadequate environmental supports to “feel” powerless and develops
into a poorly adjusted child and adolescent so consumed by negativity that the self could
not possibly be understood as a resource. All reassurance and self-agency must be
“obtained” from the outside. If these needs are not met, the adolescent runs the risk of
developing a variety of psychopathologies. Two of these potential and more common
psychopathologies are depression and anxiety. What this narrative suggests is that an
individual’s self-representational sense of self is a direct reflection of what has been both
consciously and unconsciously “learned” as a function of biology. “Feelings” or
socioemotional processes guide an individual through the learning process by responding
to ecological variables as a function of the “current sense of self’. So essentially, self
integration or identity vulnerability, depression, and anxiety are developmental in nature,
encouraged by poor neurochemical regulation and exacerbated by insufficient ecological
influence.
A major question is why the data suggest that there is a clearer relationship
between identity vulnerability and depression (over anxiety) and furthermore, why
identity fragmentation appears to be such a strong contributor to depression and anxiety.
One explanation may lie in the very nature of the variables. Like depression, a
vulnerable identity structure is generally more of a persistent experience stemming from a
compromised personality structure. Depressed mood states can last for years and do not
seem to require situational provocation in order to maintain. Because anxiety tends to be
more situational, unless feelings were provoked at the time of self-report, a majority of
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participants in this particular study would tend not to indicate high levels of anxiety. The
exception would be the smaller percentage of those who experience more pervasive
anxiety or whose stimulus threshold is low and meet the criteria for an anxiety disorder.
Another potential explanation for the findings in this particular study is that
depression may in fact be a post-traumatic response to extreme identity vulnerability.
Depression has been defined by many as the self experiencing the loss of self. When an
individual is poorly self-integrated, he or she is more vulnerable to the changing context,
especially changes that affect the way in which the individual defines him or herself. In
other words, when an individual lacks alternative sources of self-definition and is
challenged by the changing context, a loss of self is experienced. This loss of self can be
characterized as possessing higher identity vulnerability, or higher identity fragmentation,
fear of emotion and lack of confidence to cope.
A disintegrating sense of self or fragmenting identity can and will produce
depression and anxiety. The very thought of the self fading away is terrifying and would
explain why this aspect of identity vulnerability contributed more to development of
depression and anxiety than the others (fear of emotion and lack of confidence to cope).
Some of the more ubiquitous effects of a fragmented identity structure are negative mind
and mood states, like depression. Depression becomes a mechanism for the selfrepresentational sense of self to operate from; it becomes a “way of life”. Unlike the
situational nature of anxiety, depression’s time of onset is generally gradual and can
remain for some time regardless of environmental stimuli.
Further explanation for the stronger relationship between identity vulnerability
and depression may be that having a fragmented or vulnerable identity promotes a
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constant search for the self. In other words, there may be a subjective yearning to secure
a stable sense of self-agency that would have otherwise been developed during formative
years. Because it cannot be “obtained”, there is a constant sadness or emptiness that
occurs regardless of the environment.
Lewis and Sian (1995) characterize depression as being “lost in employment” or
subjectively experiencing a diminished sense of self. Therefore, the search for a stable
sense of self or secure identity stems from a depressive state and a vulnerable or
fragmented identity. So essentially, the participants in this particular study entered the
experiment lying somewhere along the identity vulnerability spectrum and were placed
under minimal pressure. They responded from the perspective of current mood states.
Those who felt sad, empty, and devoid of a secure sense of self were likely to score
higher on identity vulnerability as well as depression.
This search for the sense of self seems to be a natural consequence of having a
fragmented identity. Not “feeling” secure in one’s identity essentially keeps one from
“knowing” one’s identity. Our cognitive processes persistently attempt to restore or at
least create a balance and overcompensate for this loss by searching for means to fill the
void. Along the way, maladaptive mental habits are learned and neural pathways are
formed that heavily impact one’s state of mind. For example, an individual may learn to
catastrophize, self-blame, or experience self-doubt. These cognitive habits serve only to
exacerbate the already existing poorly integrated sense of self.
These habits, or beliefs, were “seeded” somewhere along life’s path and are
generally in response to negative environmental stimuli. They were formed in the
process of the self attempting to “repair itself’, and yet it does not. Instead these habits
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enhance sensitivity and vigilance and create a more vulnerable sense of self. As they are
re-experienced by way of triggers, they are reaffirmed and become integrated further into
personality. So essentially, if an individual feels empty and lacks a secure sense of self,
he or she runs the risk of developing these “susceptibilities” to the environment that were
created at vulnerable moments in time. How can a diminished sense of self not create
depression and anxiety?
Searching for security in the sense of self seems to be an instinctual or
evolutionary part of survival. When one cannot “know” the self, one runs the risk of
“extinction”, psychologically speaking. In extreme circumstances when an individual’s
reality testing has been compromised, the effects of “physical” annihilation anxiety can
be far reaching. Annihilation anxiety is associated with psychosis and often time creates
a feeling of paranoia and excessive worrying that leads to delusional thinking. This may
be an example of extreme identity vulnerability that is likely accompanied by extremely
persistent depression and anxiety.
Those individuals who fall within the average spectrum of reality testing
experience a range of stimulus thresholds that dictate when anxiety emerges. There is
likely a corresponding range of depression and identity vulnerability where the
fragmented sense of self fears “psychological” annihilation or nonexistence. It seems
only human nature to want to securely exist in a safe, stable state of mind. The constant
“gnawing” associated with the fear of the self “not existing” or “breaking down” does not
easily cease in someone with a vulnerable identity structure. The search for self-security
is likely to become the central priority for those individuals whose identity structures
have been compromised and serve as a tremendous distraction. In fact, common sense
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would dictate that many who suffer from an extremely fragmented or vulnerable identity
run the risk of dissociating. In other words, aspects of the self exist in separate states that
lack familiarity with one another. This type of fragmentation or vulnerability is
indicative of a low stimulus threshold for anxiety and pervasive enough to maintain a
depressive state.
Some may argue that depressed individuals perceive the world more accurately
because they are in a more self-aware state of mind. In other words, if an individual is
more aware of his or her feelings and emotions and those of others more so than the
average individual, said individual should therefore be perceiving the world more
accurately than the average individual. While depressed individuals may in fact be more
vigilant of their environment and feelings than non-depressed individuals, this does not
necessarily mean that they perceive the world accurately. An individual with a
vulnerable identity structure, or fragmented identity, is likely to see the world through a
“distorted lens”. Some perceptions may be highly accurate; others may be off-base
depending on the cognitive motive behind the perception. The difficulty lies in
distinguishing between the two.
In conclusion, it seems likely that knowing one’s identity means having security
in one’s identity. To remain unaffected, or at least less effected by negative
environmental stimuli means that one has a strong or secure sense of self. Therefore,
depression and anxiety are likely to emerge in someone who suffers from a vulnerable
identity structure. Depression is likely to remain in effect more consistently than
anxiety. Anxiety is likely to emerge episodically in response to contextual triggers.
Aside from the strong relationship between identity vulnerability, identity fragmentation,
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depression, and anxiety, all constructs utilized in this particular study, including fear of
emotion, lack of confidence to cope, panic anxiety, neurological anxiety, autonomic
anxiety, and subjective anxiety were highly associated with one another.
Future research may want to consider assessing the differences between
Spielberger’s (1983) “state” and “trait” anxiety as it relates to identity vulnerability or
fragmentation. If identity vulnerability is a more persistent type of subjective experience,
then perhaps individuals scoring high on identity vulnerability or identity fragmentation
would score high on trait anxiety. According to Spielberger, trait anxiety is a
predispositional aspect of an individual’s personality. Just opposite is state anxiety where
environmental triggers foster anxiety in an episodic fashion. So essentially, there are two
factors worth considering. First off, the experimental setting and the nature of the
questions in this particular study may have created state anxiety in some individuals.
Second, some individuals may have been predisposed to trait anxiety, which could have
been exacerbated by the experimental setting and nature of the questions. Assessment of
state verses trait anxiety may lend some insight into why there is a strong relationship
between anxiety and identity vulnerability, and yet why identity vulnerability relates to
depression over anxiety. Could identity vulnerability have substantially facilitated the
emergence of trait anxiety as it did with depression?
Aside from separating anxiety by state verses trait, future research may also want
to consider breaking down the anxiety measure utilized in this particular study into
separate constructs. It is possible that that the three constructs of identity vulnerability
lead to a single construct of anxiety just as strongly as they did with depression in this
particular study. In other words, any or all of the three constructs included under the
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umbrella of identity vulnerability (identity fragmentation, lack of confidence to cope, and
fear of emotion) could result in the emergence of neurological, subjective, panic, or
autonomic-type anxiety, exclusively. For example, identity fragmentation may prove to
be the strongest contributor to subjective anxiety. As mentioned previously, one of the
potential explanations for identity fragmentation leading to depression is the subjective
yearning to secure a stable, consistent sense of self. So why couldn’t identity
fragmentation lead to high subjective anxiety? And for that matter, is subjective anxiety
trait or state?
Future research may also want to consider assessing for psychotic and neurotic
anxiety as it relates to identity vulnerability. Common sense would tell us that both
classifications are associated with a diminished or inadequate self-structure. The
question is how do the subjective experiences of anxiety differ in content, intensity, and
duration? Is psychosis actually an extremely compromised self-structure with such
intense and persistent anxiety that reality is “forgotten?” Is neurosis characterized by a
less compromised self-structure; one that is less intense and debilitating? Could identity
vulnerability be the underlying factor behind this spectrum?
Another potential strategy for future research may be to introduce manipulation to
the self-reporting process. For example, creating or facilitating a state of objective selfawareness may lead to differences in the awareness and self-report of identity
vulnerability, depression and anxiety. Another option is to instigate state anxiety by
exposing some participants to stressful conditions via some type of performance task.
One may also want to try controlling for gender differences in self-report of utilized
measures.
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